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Voluntary Changes in Accounting Principle: 
Literature Review, Descriptive Data, and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Voluntary changes in accounting principle represent explicit and fundamental decisions by 
managers to exercise accounting discretion. This paper develops an organizing framework to 
review prior literature on voluntary changes, provides descriptive insights on contemporary 
changes, and identifies opportunities for future research on voluntary changes. The voluntary 
change literature is robust and has examined many questions using data prior to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We find that contemporary voluntary changes often vary across the 
pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods by the materiality of their income effect, 
issue type, and justifications provided by managers, suggesting that manager use of voluntary 
changes has evolved over time. Our future research opportunities consider potential determinants 
of voluntary changes including strategic incentives, environmental conditions, and manager 
characteristics, as well as the potential direct or moderating role of corporate governance and 
auditors on manager use of voluntary changes. They also consider user reactions to voluntary 
changes. By providing insight into both extant voluntary change research and the contemporary 
use of voluntary changes, our study informs standards setters who grant managers the ability to 
exercise this form of accounting discretion, as well as researchers who plan to study accounting 
choice through voluntary changes.  
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Voluntary Changes in Accounting Principle: 
Literature Review, Descriptive Data, and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper develops an organizing framework to review prior literature on voluntary 
changes in accounting principle (voluntary changes), provides descriptive insights on 
contemporary voluntary changes, and identifies opportunities for future research.1 Standards 
setters allow managers to change accounting methods from one acceptable method to another 
acceptable and preferable method through a voluntary change (FASB 2010). Voluntary changes 
have received attention in the popular press after companies such as AT&T and Verizon elected 
to recognize pension gains and losses in the year they occur rather than amortizing the gains and 
losses over time, decisions that impacted the financial statements of each company by billions of 
dollars (Rapoport 2011). For decades, researchers and popular press commentators have 
expressed skepticism about managers’ motivations for voluntary changes and concern about the 
effects of changes on the stock market (e.g., Bremser 1975; Rapoport 2011). 
This paper’s focus on voluntary changes is important for several reasons. First, voluntary 
changes represent a fundamental form of discretion conferred by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) to managers in order to maintain the decision usefulness of financial 
statements. That is, the ability to make voluntary changes allows managers to ensure that the 
financial statements best reflect economic reality when circumstances change. Second, voluntary 
changes provide unique, publicly available evidence on managers’ use of discretion. In this way, 
voluntary changes are similar to other data in the accounting literature that are not high in 
                                                 
1 Although we refer to voluntary changes in accounting principle as voluntary changes, prior studies use various 
terms such as “accounting changes,” “accounting method changes,” “accounting procedure changes,” “accounting 
procedure choice,” “changes in accounting techniques,” “changes in accounting policy,” and “discretionary 
accounting changes.” 
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frequency but provide explicit insight into an important action or decision, removing the need for 
researchers to infer, estimate, or proxy (e.g., Acito, Burks, and Johnson 2009; Keune and 
Johnstone 2012). Further, prior literature provides evidence that voluntary changes are often 
quantitatively or qualitatively material (Pincus and Wasley 1994; SEC 1999). For example, 
managers have used voluntary changes opportunistically to meet debt covenant calculations (e.g., 
Sweeney 1994; Beatty and Weber 2003), to smooth income (e.g., Moses 1987; Elliott and 
Philbrick 1990), and to minimize poor performance (e.g., Kaplan and Roll 1972; Keating and 
Zimmerman 2000). Finally, in line with these observations on the materiality of voluntary 
changes, prior literature also provides some evidence that the market responds when companies 
make voluntary changes (e.g., Harrison 1977; Dharan and Lev 1993). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on voluntary changes. 
Section 3 develops an organizing framework and extensively reviews the literature beginning in 
the early 1970s through 2016, although the study of voluntary changes declines around the late 
1990s. Section 4 provides descriptive evidence on voluntary changes from 1995-2013 to gain 
insight on contemporary trends. Our descriptive analysis considers two significant exogenous 
events, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and SFAS No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error 
Corrections (FASB 2005), that could impact managers’ use of voluntary changes. More 
specifically, we partition our data into three periods: 1) years prior to SOX, 2) years after SOX 
but before the implementation of SFAS No. 154, and 3) years after SFAS No. 154. We find that 
voluntary changes often differ across these periods in terms of the materiality of income effects, 
the issue types of changes, and justifications provided by managers. Section 5 then uses our 
organizing framework to identify opportunities for future research on the determinants of 
manager use of voluntary changes (i.e., environmental conditions, strategic incentives, and 
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manager characteristics), the potential moderating role of corporate governance and auditors on 
such use, and user reactions to voluntary changes. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
Our paper informs both standards setters and researchers. With regards to standards 
setters, our literature review and descriptive analyses provide insight into the extant literature on 
voluntary changes, as well as changes in the use of and justifications for voluntary changes 
following SOX and SFAS No. 154. In this way, our paper informs the FASB’s post-
implementation reviews of SFAS No. 154, as well as U.S. and international accounting standards 
setters’ consideration of disclosure standards. With regards to researchers, several factors 
including the age of published studies, the recent popular press interest in voluntary changes, and 
the ever-changing financial reporting environment suggest that the nature of voluntary changes 
may have evolved over recent years, motivating the reexamination of fundamental questions 
studied in prior research. In addition, advances in publicly available data and the sophistication 
of accounting research enable researchers to ask and answer questions that could not be 
considered in prior research. Our paper assists researchers who are planning to study this 
fundamental form of manager discretion by identifying many opportunities for future research on 
voluntary accounting changes and providing baseline knowledge on prior literature and 
contemporary data available for study. Voluntary changes offer rich opportunities for future 
research, particularly as we approach the implementation of significant principles-based 
accounting guidance such as Revenue from Contracts with Customers (Topic 606). 
2. Background on voluntary changes  
 The FASB faces a trade-off between creating standards with fewer rules that preparers 
could apply inconsistently and creating standards with more rules that could become too 
complex (Nelson 2003). The primary principle the FASB considers in standard setting is 
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decision usefulness for existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors (FASB 
2010). However, since standards setters cannot foresee all circumstances that could arise, 
standards without discretion will not achieve decision usefulness for all companies. As the 
continued use of the same accounting method may not be as appropriate when company 
circumstances change, the FASB allows managers the discretion to switch from one acceptable 
accounting method to a more preferable method that best fits a company’s current circumstances.  
Managers can voluntarily change to an acceptable alternative accounting method if they 
can justify that the new principle is preferable. For fiscal years beginning on or prior to 
December 15, 2005, APB Opinion No. 20 (1971) requires managers to report the cumulative 
effect of the change on prior periods as a separate income statement line item.2 For fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2005, SFAS No. 154 (now ASC 250-10) requires managers to 
record voluntary changes through retrospective application, applying the new principle as if it 
had always been used (FASB 2005).3 Retrospective application is similar to restatement in that 
both approaches require revision of prior financial statements, but retrospective application is 
distinguished from restatement in that restatement corrects prior period errors (FASB 2005). 
Managers disclose the nature of and justification for a voluntary change in the notes to 
the financial statements (FASB 2016a). In public company 10-Qs or 10-Ks, the company’s 
auditor also provides a preferability letter stating the auditor’s agreement that the new principle 
is preferable based on the company’s facts, circumstances, and justifications (FASB 2016b). If 
the change has a material effect on the financial statements, the auditor recognizes the change in 
an explanatory paragraph to the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2008). Exhibits 1 and 2 illustrate 
                                                 
2 APB Opinion No. 20 requires restatement for voluntary changes from the LIFO inventory method to another 
method, in the method for long-term construction-type contracts, or from the full cost method of accounting.  
3 When it is impracticable to apply the change to any prior period, companies apply the change prospectively from 
the earliest date practicable. 
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disclosures of pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SFAS No. 154 voluntary changes for PPL 
Corporation and Honeywell International, respectively. 
[Insert Exhibit 1 about Here] 
[Insert Exhibit 2 about Here] 
SFAS No. 154 also provides reporting guidance for accounting changes other than 
voluntary changes in accounting principle, including mandatory changes and changes in 
accounting estimate. Although these other types of changes are not the focus of our study, we 
briefly describe these changes and their reporting requirements to distinguish them from 
voluntary changes in accounting principle. When the FASB issues a codification update that 
requires companies to change to a new accounting principle, managers use the transition 
guidance provided by the new update or retrospective application of the accounting principle 
required by SFAS No. 154 to report this mandatory change (now ASC 250-10).4   
A change in accounting estimate occurs when managers identify new information that 
necessitates modification of the valuation of assets or liabilities such as uncollectible accounts, 
inventory, and the service lives and salvage values of depreciable assets. Changes in accounting 
estimate are applied prospectively (i.e., in the period of the change and/or future periods). In 
some circumstances, a change in accounting estimate can be difficult to distinguish from a 
change in accounting principle. Prior to SFAS No. 154, changes in depreciation, amortization, 
and depletion methods required a cumulative effect adjustment and an auditor preferability letter, 
as the preceding authoritative literature categorized these changes as voluntary changes in 
accounting principle. In contrast, SFAS No. 154 (ASC 250-10-45-19) categorizes changes in 
                                                 
4 A mandatory change could include any update to the Codification that “requires use of a new accounting principle, 
interprets an existing principle, expresses a preference for an accounting principle, or rejects a specific principle” 
(ASC 250-10-45-13). Mandatory changes do not require a preferability letter (Deloitte 2016). 
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depreciation, amortization, and depletion methods (e.g., straight line to accelerated method) as a 
change in estimate effected by a change in principle, which requires managers to apply the 
change prospectively and removes the requirement to file an auditor preferability letter (EY 
2016). In summary, our study focuses on voluntary changes in accounting principle reported in 
auditor preferability letters, which are distinct from changes in estimate effected by a change in 
principle, mandatory changes, and changes in estimate.  
3. Prior literature 
We review representative studies from the published literature on voluntary changes 
through 2016 to provide insight into the nature and findings of the questions studied using these 
data. Figure 1 presents an organizing framework for our review of prior research and our 
identification of opportunities for future research. Figure 1 boxes with thick borders and 
categories in bold font indicate topics that are not examined in prior research but are 
opportunities for future research. First, we consider environmental determinants for manager use 
of voluntary changes including factors such as regulation, standards, company and industry 
characteristics, and the economy. Then, we consider strategic incentives as determinants of 
manager use of voluntary changes (i.e., managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial 
distress; company and managerial reputation; industry peers). In addition, managerial 
characteristics could serve as determinants of managerial decisions regarding voluntary changes 
while the company’s corporate governance and audit firm could serve as moderators of these 
decisions. The outcome of the voluntary change process leads to financial reporting choices from 
managers and auditors. Ultimately, the financial reporting outcomes of the voluntary change 
process are consumed by financial reporting users including the stock market and analysts.  
[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
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In a separate panel for each of the following sections, Table 1 lists relevant studies in 
chronological order and summarizes information from these studies. Some study samples include 
more than one accounting technique (e.g., voluntary and mandatory changes). The table denotes 
studies that examine techniques in addition to voluntary changes in accounting principle. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
3.1 Environment – tax regulation 
 The literature on voluntary changes has extensively examined the association between 
inventory method changes to LIFO and tax savings. Voluntary changes to the LIFO method for 
inventory represent approximately 38 percent of all voluntary changes between 1969 and 1988, 
and most of these changes occurred in 1974 and 1975 (Pincus and Wasley 1994). Researchers 
consistently find that LIFO adoption is due to tax savings (Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch 
and Pincus 1988; Pincus and Wasley 1996). In addition, the evidence suggests that companies do 
not switch to LIFO immediately but wait until the tax savings become sufficiently large before 
switching methods (Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch and Pincus 1988). 
The only other studies examining the effect of specific tax regulations consider whether 
the regulations lead to opportunistic voluntary changes. For example, Bartley and Chen (1992) 
examine voluntary changes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and conclude that managers make 
changes to maintain book-tax conformity but not to reduce the company’s exposure to the 
alternative minimum tax. Keating and Zimmerman (2000) examine the 1981 tax law that 
implemented fixed depreciation schedules and provide evidence of a decrease in the number of 
depreciation method changes after the law went into effect. Their results are consistent with 
managers making larger income-increasing depreciation method changes when company 
performance is lower, suggesting that opportunism could drive at least some voluntary changes.  
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3.2 Environment – company and industry 
Prior literature has only studied company characteristics related to financial performance. 
Bremser (1975) considers earnings per share and return on investment and finds that companies 
with poor performance make voluntary changes more frequently. Similarly, Lilien, Mellman, and 
Pastena (1988) examine companies with performance at the top and bottom of the industry in 
terms of total shareholder return. They find that companies at the bottom of the industry are more 
likely than successful companies to improve income through accounting changes.  
3.3 Environment – economy 
 Prior studies on specific economic factors and voluntary changes primarily focus on 
drivers of the decision to adopt the LIFO method for valuing inventory. Dopuch and Pincus 
(1988) suggest that high inflationary periods result in greater tax savings from LIFO adoption as 
the study examines the association between tax savings and LIFO adoption (see Section 3.1). In 
addition, Pincus and Wasley (1994) find evidence of a positive correlation between LIFO 
adoptions and inflation rates (rather than tax savings), which suggests that managers choose 
LIFO to realize tax savings. The exception to the LIFO focus of economic factors studies is 
Frishkoff (1970) who examines all voluntary changes rather than only changes to LIFO. He finds 
evidence of companies making voluntary changes to minimize earnings decreases in years of 
economic uncertainty and inflation. 
3.4 Strategic incentives – managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress 
We next consider literature on managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) developed positive accounting theory to predict how managers 
choose accounting policies in response to the use of accounting information in contracts. The 
bonus plan hypothesis from positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978) suggests 
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that managers choose accounting policies that are favorable for calculating compensation under 
bonus plans. The literature generally provides evidence that voluntary changes are not associated 
with the existence of manager bonus plans, which is inconsistent with the bonus plan hypothesis 
(Holthausen 1981; Hunt 1985; Ramanan and Balachandran 1993). Healy, Kang, and Palepu 
(1987) provide evidence that while bonuses are commonly calculated using the new rather than 
the old method, switching from accelerated to straight-line depreciation or from FIFO to LIFO 
has little to no effect on manager compensation, especially in comparison to industry-wide and 
economy-wide impacts. Abdel-Khalik (1985) similarly finds that a switch from FIFO to LIFO 
does not affect manager compensation. In contrast, Ramanan and Balachandran (1993) find that 
managers receive additional short-term compensation when changing to a policy of capitalizing 
interest on long-term construction projects, but the full evidence from the study does not support 
the bonus plan hypothesis. The reasoning for the lack of findings related to bonus contracts and 
voluntary changes might be provided by Abdel-Khalik, Chi, and Ghicas (1987) who find that 
compensation changes are associated with the real (i.e., cash flow) rather than the income 
consequences of accounting changes. Overall, the literature provides virtually no evidence that 
managers benefit from bonus compensation achieved through the effects of voluntary changes.  
 Voluntary changes associated with big baths and income smoothing also can be related to 
managerial contracts. Indeed, Moore (1973) finds that the majority of companies with new 
managers have income-decreasing voluntary changes that likely increase the probability of future 
bonuses. Gordon (1964) argues that a smooth trend of earnings maximizes management’s 
reputation and welfare, and he suggests that managers could use accounting policies to help 
produce such a trend. The evidence in the literature indicates that managers smooth income with 
voluntary changes, particularly those in manager as opposed to owner controlled companies 
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(Smith 1976; Salamon and Smith 1979) as well as those facing bonus plans, political costs, and 
unexpected earnings (Moses 1987). In addition, Elliott and Philbrick (1990) find evidence that is 
consistent with managers making voluntary changes in order to smooth income. 
 Researchers who examine the role of debt contracts and financial distress on manager use 
of voluntary changes hypothesize that managers are more likely to make income-increasing 
voluntary changes when they are nearing default on covenants or have limited ability to receive 
funding through credit markets. Most studies support this hypothesis, finding that managers are 
more likely to make income-increasing voluntary changes when approaching debt covenant 
default (Labelle 1990; Sweeney 1994) and experiencing financial distress (Schwartz 1982). In 
addition, Beatty, Ramesh, and Webber (2002) find that companies with debt contracts that allow 
voluntary changes in the calculation of covenants are willing to pay substantially higher interest 
rates, suggesting that managers perceive value in the ability to potentially use voluntary changes 
to improve covenant ratios. Beatty and Weber (2003) follow up to report that companies with 
debt contracts that allow voluntary changes are more likely to make income-increasing changes.  
Further support for the debt covenant hypothesis emerges from studies on specific types 
of voluntary changes. Hunt (1985) provides evidence that companies are less likely to adopt 
LIFO when financial ratios approach debt covenant limitations, likely due to the fact that LIFO 
during the study’s time period decreases income and worsens financial ratios. Johnson and 
Ramanan (1988) also find that oil and gas companies with higher or increasing levels of debt are 
more likely to switch to full-cost accounting from successful efforts. In contrast to these studies, 
Holthausen (1981) concludes that covenant constraints are not a determinant of voluntary 
changes from accelerated depreciation methods to the straight-line method. 
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3.5 Strategic incentives – industry peers 
 It is possible that companies in the same industry make the same voluntary changes as 
circumstances change or to compete with peers for resources. Pincus and Wasley (1994) is the 
only study of which we are aware that examines the extent to which peers in the same industry 
make similar types of voluntary changes in the same time periods. They do not find evidence of 
clusters of voluntary changes in the same industry and year, except for LIFO adoptions in 1974. 
3.6 Audit firm 
 Two descriptive studies provide evidence on the role of the auditor in making voluntary 
changes. A study conducted with data prior to the surge of LIFO adoptions in the 1970s finds 
that LIFO adoptions are more likely for clients of some firms, although there is no association 
between specific auditors and the direction of income effects from the changes (Eggleton, 
Penman, and Twombly 1976). Gosman (1973) provides descriptive evidence that clients of one 
firm are less likely to report voluntary changes identified using consistency paragraphs in the 
auditor’s report during the sample period of 1959-1968.  
3.7 User reactions – stock market 
Following the work of Ball and Brown (1968), researchers began examining whether the 
market reacts to voluntary changes. This early literature generally finds that investors do not 
react to voluntary changes, suggesting that the market is efficient (e.g., Ball 1972; Baskin 1972; 
Kaplan and Roll 1972; Sunder 1973, 1975; Holthausen 1981). The focus of the literature then 
shifts to investigating market responses to the adoption of LIFO. In contrast to earlier studies, 
Abdel-Khalik and McKeown (1978), Brown (1980), Ricks (1982), and Hand (1993) find 
evidence of a negative reaction to the announcement of LIFO adoption, consistent with the 
market reacting to the lower earnings associated with LIFO. However, Biddle and Lindahl 
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(1982) find a positive association between abnormal returns and the magnitude of tax savings 
from LIFO adoption, and Stevenson (1987) also finds a positive market reaction to LIFO 
switches using more accurate dates for the announcement of LIFO adoption than prior studies. 
Other studies examine the market’s reaction to all types of voluntary changes. These 
studies generally provide evidence of a negative market reaction that is contingent on other 
factors. In particular, Harrison (1977) finds a negative market reaction to income-increasing 
voluntary changes, and Dharan and Lev (1993) find negative abnormal returns only for 
companies with income-increasing changes and only in the five years after the change. Likewise, 
Cheng and Coulombe (1993) indicate abnormal returns are negative for companies that make 
income-increasing voluntary changes but only when the companies face financial adversity that 
was previously unknown to the market. Linck, Lopez, and Rees (2007) find no evidence of either 
abnormal returns or differences in earnings informativeness following voluntary changes. In 
general, prior research on the market’s response to voluntary changes yields mixed results, but 
suggests that any market response to voluntary changes is likely contingent upon other factors. 
3.8 User reactions – analysts 
Prior literature suggests that analysts are prone to misestimating earnings for companies 
with voluntary changes. Brown (1983) provides evidence that analysts inaccurately forecast 
company earnings in the year following voluntary changes in pension costing assumptions. 
Similarly, analysts overestimate company earnings in years with switches to LIFO (Biddle and 
Ricks 1988). Analysts also have larger forecast errors and forecast dispersion in company years 
with voluntary changes (Elliott and Philbrick 1990). 
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4. Insights from contemporary data 
Although the published literature on voluntary changes primarily examines periods prior 
to the late 1990s and early 2000s, the passage of time and associated environmental changes are 
not necessarily sufficient to indicate that researchers should revisit fundamental questions 
examined by prior research. In this section, we first discuss recent significant events that have 
occurred since most prior studies were published. Then, we use voluntary changes reported after 
the sample periods of most prior studies to provide descriptive evidence on whether the nature of 
voluntary changes evolves over time. 
4.1 Significant events since prior studies 
At least two significant events have occurred since the time periods used in prior 
literature. First, SOX introduced many reforms affecting the financial reporting environment, 
which could increase the reporting of voluntary changes due to efforts to improve financial 
reporting quality. However, increased regulatory scrutiny and greater penalties after SOX make 
the opportunistic or inappropriate use of voluntary changes riskier for managers and auditors. 
The post-SOX environment also has greater conservatism in financial reporting (Lobo and Zhou 
2006, 2010), less earnings management (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008), and less ability to hide 
information (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 2009), suggesting managers might be less likely to 
report voluntary changes after SOX. As a result, the use of voluntary changes might increase, 
decrease, or stay the same after SOX. 
Second, the FASB issued SFAS No. 154 for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 
2005. Although its proponents argued that it enhances financial statement consistency for the 
periods presented and is more useful for making decisions (FASB 2005), practitioners 
anticipated that the costs of retrospective application would outweigh the benefits, and they 
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expected that users’ perceptions of financial statement credibility would suffer due to numerous 
revisions of prior-period financial statements and improper conclusions that retrospective 
application is the correction of errors (Deloitte 2004; EY 2004; Pfizer 2004).5 Accordingly, some 
comment letter writers predicted that companies would make fewer voluntary changes in order to 
avoid the financial statement user confusion and costs associated with applying the changes 
(Deloitte 2004; EY 2004). Next, we consider both SOX and SFAS No. 154 as we present 
descriptive evidence on voluntary changes to provide contemporary insight into their nature. 
4.2 Sample selection and company industry 
 We identify voluntary changes through auditors’ preferability letters filed in 10-Qs and 
10-Ks for fiscal year ends from June 1, 1995 through December 31, 2013.6,7 Table 2, Panel A 
shows that we reduce our initial sample of 1,315 unique preferability letters by 248 and 61 due to 
missing Compustat data and duplicates resulting from subsidiaries whose parent companies are 
also in our sample, respectively, leading to a sample of 1,006 companies. We perform analyses 
that require disclosure of the cumulative effect of the changes using 604 observations. Table 2, 
Panel B presents the industry representation of the voluntary change companies in our sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
We measure the cumulative effect upon implementation of voluntary changes as the 
impact to net income or retained earnings. For pre-SFAS No. 154 changes, we use the prior 
period amount presented on a separate line item on the income statement as our cumulative 
                                                 
5 SFAS No. 154 also requires retrospective application for mandatory accounting changes. Deloitte (2004) noted that 
some companies applying retrospective treatment to all mandatory changes could have been required to revise their 
prior period financial statements four separate times in 2003. 
6 Regulation S-K Title 17 § 229.601 Paragraph b(18) requires filing preferability letters in Exhibit 18. Some 
preferability letters disclose more than one voluntary change. We do not collect mandatory accounting changes or 
voluntary changes in accounting estimates, as they are not disclosed via preferability letters. 
7 We use directEDGAR (Kealey 2013) for our search of fiscal year ends from June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2011 
and use Bloomberg BNA for our search of fiscal year ends from June 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013. 
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effect (see $10 million increase in Exhibit 1, Panel C). For post-SFAS No. 154 changes, we use 
the impact of the change on retained earnings as our cumulative effect (see $3,464 million 
reduction in retained earnings in Exhibit 2, Panel C). Our approach allows us to consistently 
measure the impact of voluntary changes across the two reporting regimes in our study.  
4.3 Frequency and income effect of voluntary changes by time period 
Table 3 compares by time period (pre-SOX, post-SOX, post-SFAS No. 154) the 
frequency of voluntary changes, average number of changes per year, percentage of changes 
disclosing an income effect and the direction of the effect, and percentage of changes with an 
income effect that are above and below common materiality thresholds. We define pre-SOX as 
1995 to 2001, post-SOX as 2002 to 2005, and post-SFAS No. 154 as 2006 to 2013. On average, 
companies reported 52.9 voluntary changes per year. However, the average annual number of 
voluntary changes increases from 51.3 in the pre-SOX period to 60.8 in the post-SOX period. It 
then decreases to 50.5 in the post-SFAS No. 154 period, suggesting that manager reporting of 
voluntary changes could be subject to external factors such as regulation and standards. We 
return to these findings when we discuss future research opportunities (e.g., Sections 5.1 and 
5.2). The percentage of voluntary changes disclosing income effect data decreases over time.8 In 
the pre-SOX period, 79.1 percent of voluntary changes disclose an income effect, but the 
percentage decreases to 65.8 in the post-SOX period and drops to 39.6 in the post-SFAS No. 154 
period. These results suggest that managers perceive retrospective application as increasing the 
costs associated with making voluntary changes with income effects after SFAS No. 154, which 
is consistent with critics’ predictions. Sections 5.11 and 5.13 highlight how variation in the 
                                                 
8 Voluntary changes for which income effect data are not disclosed include those that: 1) do not have an income 
effect, 2) have an income effect that is not disclosed (i.e., deemed too immaterial to disclose), or 3) are applied 
prospectively (i.e., retrospective application after SFAS No. 154 is deemed “impracticable”). 
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application of voluntary changes created by SFAS No. 154 can provide additional insight into 
managers’ motivations and their effects on users. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
Finally, Table 3 presents the quantitative materiality of the voluntary changes disclosing 
an income effect. We use revenues as our materiality benchmark (Eilifsen and Messier 2015) and 
report the percentage of voluntary changes that are less than 0.5 percent, between 0.5 and 1.0 
percent, between 1.0 and 2.0 percent, and greater than 2.0 percent of sales. The percentage of 
voluntary changes less than 0.5 percent of sales increases while the percentage of changes 
greater than or equal to 2.0 percent of sales decreases from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX 
period but the percentages remain statistically the same between the post-SOX and post-SFAS 
No. 154 periods. These results suggest that researchers could exploit this variation in quantitative 
materiality to study determinants and effects across material and immaterial voluntary changes. 
4.4 Voluntary change issue types and justifications 
Table 4 presents the percentage of voluntary changes by issue type across the pre-SOX, 
post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods. Appendix A provides definitions and examples of 
issue types. Table 4 reveals that, overall, changes in the timing of goodwill impairment 
evaluations are the most frequent type of change (17.7 percent) followed by changes for LIFO to 
FIFO (16.7) and revenue recognition (7.7). Changes in the timing of goodwill impairment 
evaluations and in financial statement classification are more prevalent in the post-SOX than the 
pre-SOX period while changes in revenue recognition and pension recognition are less likely.9 
Table 4 indicates that managers are more likely after SFAS No. 154 relative to the post-SOX 
period to make voluntary changes related to goodwill impairment test timing, pension 
                                                 
9 In the interest of brevity, we discuss variation in the proportion of total voluntary changes for issue types 
representing 50 or more total observations in the sample. 
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recognition, and financial statement classification. In contrast, managers were less likely after 
SFAS No. 154 relative to the post-SOX period to make voluntary changes for LIFO to FIFO, 
revenue recognition, and amortization/depreciation expense. The increases in goodwill 
impairment test timing and classification changes in the post-SOX and post-SFAS No. 154 
periods provide an explanation for the decrease in percentage of voluntary changes with income 
effects in these same periods (Table 3). In summary, manager reporting of voluntary changes by 
issue type is not consistent across time, suggesting some factors or circumstances could lead to 
increases or decreases in specific types of voluntary changes. Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5 
highlight opportunities for future research related to results identified in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
Table 5 presents 1,528 justifications that managers of our 1,006 sample companies 
disclose for voluntary changes, an average of 1.54 justifications per company. Each reason 
provided for voluntary changes falls into one of six categories: 1) more justifiable from an 
accounting perspective because it better reflects economic reality or better follows principles 
perceived as important such as matching or conservatism (40.0 percent of all reasons provided), 
2) more advantageous administratively due to new systems or process improvements (15.6), 3) 
more consistent with and more comparable to peer companies (14.9), 4) more consistent with 
other company policies (13.6), 5) responsive to business or strategy changes (8.9), and 6) 
justifiable for other reasons (7.0). Appendix B defines and provides examples for each category. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here]   
The descriptive evidence on justifications by time period indicates that the frequency of 
accounting-related justifications has neither increased nor decreased across the periods. In 
contrast, the use of administrative justifications increased after SOX and again after SFAS No. 
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154. The increased use of administrative justifications coincides with the greater likelihoods of 
making voluntary changes without an income effect as revealed in Tables 3 and 4. In addition, 
justifications related to business or strategy changes are used less frequently after both SOX and 
SFAS No. 154. Finally, companies are more likely after SOX than before SOX to justify changes 
as conforming policies across the company and are less likely to justify changes as following 
practices of peer companies. It appears from the justifications data that managers after SOX are 
considering internal (i.e., administrative efficiencies, conforming disparate policies to the same 
method) more than external (i.e., copying peer practices, responding to business changes) 
benefits when making voluntary changes. In Sections 5.8, 5.9, and 5.11, we discuss opportunities 
for future research using manager justifications. 
Overall, the results indicate that there are differences in the use of voluntary changes over 
time. This variation suggests that opportunities exist to extend prior literature on voluntary 
changes. Further, new opportunities exist for future research on voluntary changes. In the next 
section, we discuss potential areas for future research on voluntary changes.  
5. Opportunities for future research 
5.1 Environment – regulation 
Similar to our review of prior literature, we use the framework presented in Figure 1 to 
organize our discussion of opportunities for future research on voluntary changes.10 Changes in 
the regulatory landscape such as the introduction of SOX provide opportunities for researchers to 
consider the impact of regulation on manager use of voluntary changes. After SOX, managers 
have incentives to make voluntary changes in order to better reflect economic reality in the 
financial statements or to implement procedural modifications related to financial reporting. 
                                                 
10 For parsimony, our discussion focuses on research opportunities using archival data, although we recognize that 
many of our research opportunities can be examined with experimental or qualitative methods. 
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However, reducing risk and reporting more conservatively after SOX could also decrease 
manager use of voluntary changes if, as the prior literature finds prior to SOX, managers use 
voluntary changes opportunistically for reasons related to poor financial performance and debt 
contracting (Sections 3.2 and 3.4).11 As we discuss in Section 4.3, we observe an increase in the 
average annual number of voluntary changes reported after SOX (Table 3). However, it is 
unclear whether this finding would hold in a multivariate test, suggesting research is necessary to 
determine the overall impact of SOX on the reporting of voluntary changes. 
Although the overarching goal of SOX is to improve the financial reporting quality of 
publicly-traded companies, some individual components of SOX likely have greater potential 
than others to encourage or discourage manager reporting of voluntary changes.12 For illustration 
purposes, we consider one of these components. The requirement for and value of auditor 
attestation of internal control over financial reporting is arguably one of the most debated and 
contested aspects of SOX. Accelerated filers and large accelerated filers are subject to SOX 404 
(b) and must have an auditor attest to the effectiveness of their internal control over financial 
reporting. In contrast, non-accelerated filers are not subject to SOX 404 (b) and are only required 
by SOX 404 (a) to have managers attest to the effectiveness of internal controls. If the 
requirement for auditor attestation of internal control encourages managers to improve both 
                                                 
11 Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB No. 99), Materiality (SEC 1999) identifies circumstances where items that 
are quantitatively small could have a qualitatively material impact on financial statements. These circumstances 
include masking a change in earnings or other trends, failing to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts, changing a loss 
into income, compliance with loan covenants, and increasing management’s compensation. The benchmarks 
itemized in SAB No. 99 provide researchers with examples to consider in determining whether managers 
opportunistically use voluntary changes to achieve financial reporting outcomes. Throughout Section 5, unless 
otherwise specified, we refer to voluntary changes that enable managers to achieve benchmarks such as those 
referenced in SAB No. 99 as “opportunistic.” 
12 A contemporaneous study considers the impact of a specific requirement of SOX regulation on manager use of 
voluntary accounting changes. Keune and Keune (2017) suggest that managers make voluntary accounting changes 
as part of their efforts to improve financial reporting processes and procedures following the identification of a 
material weakness in internal control. 
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financial reporting processes and quality beyond only the requirements of SOX 404 (a), we 
expect companies subject to SOX 404 (b) make more voluntary changes than companies subject 
only to SOX 404 (a).  
In addition, variation in the nature of voluntary changes including their justifications and 
their impact on income has the potential to provide insight into whether auditor attestation on 
internal control encourages the improvement of financial reporting outcomes (e.g., accounting-
improvement justifications) or financial reporting processes (e.g., administrative justifications). 
Tables 4 and 5 reveal an increase in voluntary changes that do not impact net income (e.g., 
goodwill timing and pensions timing) and an increase in manager reporting of administrative 
justifications after SOX (Section 4.4). However, it is unclear if these increases are more or less 
prominent in companies subject to specific SOX mandates, as companies with auditor attestation 
of internal control could be less likely to report voluntary changes if auditor attestation of 
internal control curbs managers’ opportunistic use of voluntary changes. For these reasons, we 
suggest the following research question as illustrative of questions that researchers can examine 
on specific components of SOX: 
RQ1:  Are companies subject to the SOX mandate for auditor attestation on internal control 
more likely or less likely to report voluntary changes than companies only subject to the 
SOX mandate for manager reporting on internal control? If more likely, do the voluntary 
changes impact financial reporting outcomes or financial reporting processes?  
 
5.2 Environment – standards 
New accounting standards also provide opportunities for research on voluntary 
accounting changes. SFAS No. 154 is an accounting standard that critics suggested would create 
a disincentive for managers to report voluntary changes, but this standard as it relates to 
voluntary changes has not been considered in the literature (see Section 4.1). Accordingly, it 
provides many opportunities for future research that can shed light on both voluntary changes 
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and the effects of financial statement presentation on managers’ accounting choices. One of the 
most apparent questions is whether SFAS No. 154 and its retrospective application requirement 
is associated with a decrease in voluntary changes. The average number of voluntary changes per 
year decreases from the post-SOX period to the post-SFAS No. 154 period (Section 4.3). 
However, the number of changes per year after SFAS No. 154 is similar to that of the pre-SOX 
period so it is unclear whether the standard (in a multivariate setting) has had an effect on 
managers making voluntary changes (Section 4.3).  
Another reporting change implemented in SFAS No. 154 provides a second question to 
examine the impact of reporting requirements on managers’ decisions to implement accounting 
changes. As discussed in Section 2, the impact of changes in depreciation, amortization, and 
depletion method was historically reported as a cumulative effect adjustment, but is reported 
prospectively after SFAS No. 154. In addition, an auditor preferability letter is no longer 
required for these changes after SFAS No. 154. Accordingly, the costs for reporting changes in 
depreciation, amortization, and depletion method are lower after SFAS No. 154. If reporting 
costs are a primary determinant in manager decisions to make accounting changes as critics of 
SFAS No. 154 contend, we expect to see no change or even an increase in depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion method changes after SFAS No. 154.13 In line with the above 
discussion, we propose the following research questions: 
RQ2: Are managers less likely to report voluntary changes after SFAS No. 154’s requirement 
for retrospective application of changes? 
 
RQ3:  Are managers more likely to report changes in depreciation, amortization, and depletion 
method after SFAS No. 154 modified the reporting for these changes? 
 
                                                 
13 Consistent with the removal of the preferability letter requirement, amortization/depreciation expense voluntary 
changes decline after SFAS No. 154 (Section 4.4). In addition to preferability letters, this research question also 
requires the collection of data on changes in estimate that are effected by a change in accounting principle after 
SFAS No. 154.  
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Accounting standards other than SFAS No. 154 also have the potential to modify 
manager reporting of voluntary changes if these standards modify the accounting discretion 
available to managers. We focus our discussion on the accounting for revenue recognition but 
acknowledge that additional research opportunities likely exist surrounding other accounting 
standard changes. In 2014, the FASB issued Update No. 2014-09, Revenue from Contracts with 
Customers (Topic 606), which public companies apply in fiscal years beginning after December 
15, 2017. This update replaces SAB No. 104 and industry-specific explicit rules on revenue 
recognition and provides principles-based guidance for public company revenue recognition, 
likely increasing the discretion available to managers in accounting for revenue.14 Future 
research can consider the extent to which this substantial shift in revenue accounting impacts 
manager use of revenue-related discretion via voluntary changes, thereby informing future FASB 
deliberations.15 We suggest the following research question based on the above discussion, as 
illustrative of the nature of future research opportunities related to accounting standard setting: 
RQ4:  Are managers more likely to report voluntary changes for revenue after the effective date 
of the principles-based guidance in Topic 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers?  
 
5.3 Environment – company and industry 
In addition to the external influences of regulations and standards, internal influences 
such as company characteristics and circumstances could also be important to managers’ 
                                                 
14 Not all industries operate under specific and detailed revenue recognition standards and guidance. Companies in 
industries without specific guidance follow general guidance issued by the FASB and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 
104 until the implementation of Topic 606. Therefore, it is possible that managers in some industries have less 
discretion related to revenue recognition after the implementation of Topic 606. 
15 In 1999 the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, which 
was replaced by Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104 in 2003. These rules, along with developments in industry-
specific guidance during this period, clarified the revenue recognition accounting for public companies, likely 
reducing the discretion available to managers and the opportunities to make revenue-related voluntary changes. 
Consistent with this expectation, we observe a decrease in revenue recognition changes after SOX in Table 4 
(Section 4.4). Another potential research question related to standards is whether SAB No. 101 and SAB No. 104, 
along with industry-specific guidance, reduced manager reporting of revenue-related voluntary changes. 
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decisions regarding voluntary changes. Research in this area can provide insight into the reasons 
for the changes, informing future accounting standard setting. We highlight two examples of 
company characteristics and circumstances that have not been examined in prior literature and 
could be determinants of voluntary changes.  
First, companies that merge with or acquire other companies could be more likely to use 
different accounting methods for the same transactions within the consolidated company. More 
specifically, a newly acquired company could use a different inventory costing method than the 
acquirer or could expense certain transactions that the acquirer capitalizes. As the companies 
integrate their operations, managers could be more likely to make voluntary changes in order to 
ensure policies are consistent within the combined entity, resulting in simplified accounting 
processes and lower risk of future misstatements. The results in Table 5 reveal that managers 
commonly justify voluntary changes by stating the new method conforms policies across the 
company and that the use of this justification increased after the passage of SOX (Section 4.4). 
Future research could further examine whether acquisitions are more likely to lead to voluntary 
changes after SOX as the usefulness of conforming policies may have increased after SOX due 
to the requirement for internal control assessments. This discussion leads to our next proposed 
research question: 
RQ5: Are managers more likely to make voluntary changes after mergers and acquisitions that 
result in inconsistent methods within the company? Are voluntary changes after mergers 
and acquisitions more likely in the post-SOX period? Is this effect present in companies 
disclosing auditor and/or manager reports on internal control? 
 
 Another company characteristic that could encourage managers to make voluntary 
changes is a company’s exposure to reporting requirements other than U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). When companies have subsidiaries in countries that require 
IFRS, for example, managers could be more likely to switch to policies under U.S. GAAP that 
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are more similar to IFRS. Aligning internal policies across IFRS and U.S. GAAP could reduce 
the administrative burden of maintaining different accounting policies for similar transactions 
and potentially improve the consistency of accounting methods within the company. For 
instance, companies with operations in IFRS reporting countries could be more likely to 
voluntarily change from LIFO to the FIFO method in the U.S. to align reporting for U.S. 
locations with reporting for locations that have statutory reporting requirements in IFRS, which 
does not allow the use of the LIFO method.16 Accordingly, we suggest the following question: 
RQ6:  Do companies that have a substantial presence in IFRS reporting countries make more 
voluntary changes? If so, do these changes “converge” U.S. and IFRS accounting 
methods within the company? 
 
Similar to company characteristics, industry characteristics and circumstances could also 
be associated with managers’ likelihood of making voluntary changes. An unexamined industry 
characteristic and opportunity for future research is industry concentration or competition. When 
industry concentration is high, companies could place greater importance on implementing 
accounting policies that enhance their ability to compare favorably to industry competitors in 
order to attract capital. A company, for example, that expenses certain costs might switch to 
capitalizing and amortizing if operating results under immediate expensing appear less 
favorable.17 The same reasoning could apply to other policies that have income effects such as 
depreciation methods, inventory costing methods, and pension recognition policies, suggesting 
the following research question: 
RQ7:  Are companies in highly concentrated or more competitive industries more likely to make 
voluntary changes?  
 
                                                 
16 This expectation could be one factor contributing to the substantial percentage of voluntary changes (16.7 percent) 
from LIFO to FIFO during our sample period (see Table 4). 
17 This argument could also apply to peer companies. That is, industry peers in highly concentrated or competitive 
industries may be more likely to make voluntary changes after one company in the industry makes a similar change. 
To avoid redundancy, we do not propose a similar research question in our Section 5.7 discussion of industry peers. 
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5.4 Environment – economy 
In addition to factors associated with individual companies and their specific industries, 
macro-level economic factors could impact a company’s circumstances and managers’ 
subsequent decision to report a voluntary change. A wide range of opportunities is available for 
future research in this area. We offer as examples two possible links between economic factors 
and the likelihood that a company reports a voluntary change. First, our sample period of 1995-
2013 includes an economic downturn in the early 2000s and the financial crisis in 2008. 
Unfavorable economic climates present a change in circumstances that could necessitate a 
change in policies. For instance, in periods of economic decline, goodwill impairments could be 
more likely or more significant, and goodwill impairment evaluations in these circumstances 
likely require more time to complete to determine if a writedown is necessary. As a result, 
companies could make a voluntary change to move the timing of goodwill impairment 
evaluations earlier in the year to ensure adequate time to complete analyses and evaluations prior 
to year-end. (See Section 4.4 for a discussion of changes in the frequency of timing of goodwill 
evaluations in our sample.) Alternatively, financial performance often suffers during economic 
downturns, and managers could be more likely to make income-increasing voluntary changes or 
voluntary changes that improve the appearance of financial statement trends to help offset the 
effects of the downturn on the financial statements. Therefore, we propose the following research 
question: 
RQ8:   Are managers more likely to report voluntary changes during a financial crisis or 
economic downturn? If so, is this increase due to opportunism or improving financial 
reporting quality and processes?  
 
A second example of a research opportunity related to economic changes extends prior 
work on the LIFO inventory method. As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, the literature has 
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extensively examined the factors leading to widespread LIFO adoptions in 1974 and 1975. 
However, to our knowledge, no studies have examined why companies move away from LIFO. 
The prior literature attributes LIFO adoptions to inflation as well as tax savings, but it is unclear 
when and why companies elect to change away from LIFO, especially since the changes occur 
over time rather than all at once. As we noted in Section 4.4, changes from LIFO to FIFO are one 
of the most common issue types in our sample (Table 4). It is possible that consistently low 
inflation or increases in productivity and efficiency cause the LIFO method to be less 
representationally faithful. Similar to Dopuch and Pincus (1988) who find that LIFO adoptions 
occur once the tax benefits become sufficiently large, research into changes away from LIFO 
could investigate whether a particular economic factor leads to a tipping point at which managers 
change to a different method. The literature made significant progress on our understanding of 
inventory costing decisions after the economic conditions of the 1970s, but there is much that we 
still do not understand about factors that lead to inventory method changes after previously 
studied conditions subside. This leads to our next proposed research question: 
RQ9:  Are managers more likely to move away from the LIFO inventory method in times of 
low or decreasing inflation or in times of high or increasing productivity/efficiency? 
 
5.5 Strategic incentives – managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress 
Although the impact of bonus plans, debt covenants, and financial distress on voluntary 
changes was a focus of prior research (see Section 3.4), there are reasons to revisit these areas. 
We provide examples of two such reasons. First, a reexamination of the bonus plan hypothesis is 
warranted due to the contemporary availability of a variety of executive compensation data. 
More detailed executive compensation disclosure data became available in proxy statements 
beginning in 1992 and was further enhanced in 2006 to include disclosure of specific targets and 
performance measures. It is possible that, while voluntary changes are not related to the existence 
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of a bonus plan overall (e.g., Hunt 1985), changes could be associated with closeness to specific 
bonus targets available in more recent proxy statements. Researchers could reexamine the impact 
of bonus plans on voluntary changes using these more detailed disclosure data. 
Second, SFAS No. 154 significantly modified the reporting for voluntary changes (see 
Section 2). Accordingly, it significantly modified the ways that managers can use voluntary 
changes to opportunistically achieve financial reporting outcomes due to the requirement for 
retrospective treatment. For this reason, SFAS No. 154 provides motivation to examine whether 
managers continue to use voluntary changes to meet debt covenant calculations.  
Many entirely new research questions are also possible using contemporary data and 
conditions. For brevity, we focus on only one potential avenue. Retrospective treatment required 
by SFAS No. 154 does not preclude managers from using voluntary changes opportunistically to 
achieve certain outcomes. Instead, retrospective treatment likely modifies how managers use 
voluntary changes opportunistically. For example, managers could be more likely after SFAS 
No. 154 to use voluntary changes to execute an opportunistic strategy to shift earnings decreases 
to prior years, resulting in the appearance of lower income in prior years, higher income in future 
years, and an improved overall trend across years. For example, Table 4 reveals an increase in 
pension recognition changes after SFAS No. 154 that often decrease prior-year income through 
retrospective application, likely resulting in increased income in current or future periods 
(Section 4.4). Future research could examine whether managers use the retrospective application 
of voluntary changes to shift losses into prior periods as part of a strategy to improve earnings 
trends, leading to the following research question: 
RQ10: After SFAS No. 154, are managers more likely to make voluntary changes that shift 
losses rather than gains to prior periods? If so, does this strategy improve the appearance 
of the trend in earnings?  
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5.6 Strategic incentives – company and managerial reputation 
Companies and managers experience reputation damaging events such as financial 
reporting fraud that call into question the quality of their financial reporting practices. It is 
important for managers to quickly reassure financial statement users and other external parties 
that the company is committed to high-quality financial reporting because damaging events 
could be associated with lower stock prices, higher costs of capital, manager turnover, and 
penalties from regulators (Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004; 
Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006). Managers could potentially use the public disclosure and 
corresponding auditor approval of voluntary changes to signal managerial diligence to investors, 
regulators, and the external labor market after a negative event, such as financial reporting fraud. 
Based on this discussion, we propose the following example of a research question in this area: 
RQ11: Do managers make voluntary changes after a reputation damaging event such as financial 
reporting fraud? If so, does the reporting of voluntary changes improve the market’s 
response and/or regulators’ response in these circumstances? 
 
5.7 Strategic incentives – industry peers 
Although Pincus and Wasley (1994) do not find evidence of companies in the same 
industry making voluntary changes in the same year (Section 3.5), our justification results in 
Table 5 suggest that managers do consider peer practices when determining their own accounting 
policies. We also observed during data collection that the same voluntary changes were made by 
multiple companies but over a longer period of time than one year. For instance, several cruise 
and cargo ship companies made income-increasing voluntary changes related to drydock costs 
over many years (e.g., Europa Cruises Corporation in 1995, Seaboard Corporation in 2003, and 
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. in 2005). The data and anecdotal evidence raise questions on 
whether and why companies change accounting methods after peer companies also make similar 
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changes. Future research could examine whether companies make voluntary changes after peers 
for comparability purposes or for opportunistic reasons. This discussion leads to the following 
research question: 
RQ12: Do managers make voluntary changes in response to voluntary changes made by their 
industry peers? Is this to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic reasons? 
 
5.8 Manager characteristics  
Although managers are central to the voluntary change process, the only prior study of 
which we are aware that examines a manager characteristic is Moore (1973), who finds that 
companies with new managers are more likely to make income-decreasing voluntary changes 
than companies without management changes. For that reason, many opportunities exist related 
to the impact of manager characteristics on voluntary changes. For example, researchers could 
examine whether greater financial accounting expertise is associated with managers who make 
voluntary changes, as the identification and justification of more preferable accounting methods 
(for opportunistic reasons or to improve financial reporting) requires relatively advanced 
accounting knowledge.18 Further, researchers could also examine whether these manager 
characteristics lead to any differences in the reporting of opportunistic voluntary changes and 
changes to improve financial reporting. We propose the following research question as an 
example of the many questions that are possible: 
RQ13: Are managers with greater financial accounting expertise more or less likely to make 
voluntary changes? If so, are they more likely to make changes to improve financial 
reporting or for opportunistic reasons? Are they more likely to disclose justifications that 
reflect whether they make changes to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic 
reasons? 
 
                                                 
18 Relevant indicators of accounting expertise include certifications, a degree in accounting versus finance, the 
number of years of accounting experience, the number of years of specific industry experience, and prior manager or 
partner experience in public accounting. 
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5.9  Corporate governance 
The majority of research on voluntary changes occurred prior to the SOX-mandated 
enhancement of the audit committee’s role, suggesting many new research opportunities exist 
regarding how the audit committee impacts the use of voluntary changes. In its governance 
capacity, the audit committee could moderate managers’ role in the use of voluntary changes 
(i.e., an interaction between manager and audit committee characteristics). For example, 
independent audit committee members, members with longer tenure, and members with more 
expertise could provide greater oversight of financial reporting and be more likely to reject 
voluntary changes that are opportunistic or do not improve financial reporting and could be more 
likely to accept voluntary changes that improve financial reporting. However, it is also possible 
that the audit committee drives (i.e., a main effect) the use of voluntary changes by initiating or 
suggesting changes to managers.19 Audit committee members often have officer positions and 
directorships at other companies. These “network” companies could use accounting methods 
other than the methods used by the company, potentially resulting in an audit committee member 
suggesting a more preferable accounting method for the company. Alternatively, “network” 
companies could initiate voluntary changes, leading an audit committee member to suggest a 
similar change at the company. As an illustration of the opportunities available related to audit 
committees and voluntary changes, we propose the following research question:  
RQ14: Do novel policies and/or voluntary changes at network companies lead audit committee 
members to initiate voluntary changes? Is this to improve financial reporting or for 
opportunistic reasons? How do these companies justify their changes? 
 
                                                 
19 For simplicity, we depict the audit committee’s and audit firm’s potential effects as moderators in Figure 1.  
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5.10 Audit firm 
Although the auditor must evaluate voluntary changes (see Section 2), prior literature 
provides only univariate evidence indicating the auditor could impact managers’ use of this form 
of discretion (see Section 3.6). Accordingly, many opportunities for future research are available 
regarding the auditor’s role in managers’ voluntary change decisions, although we provide only 
one specific avenue for future research in this area. It is possible that auditor expertise moderates 
managers’ use of voluntary changes as auditors with greater expertise may curtail opportunistic 
reporting of voluntary changes or encourage managers’ reporting of changes that improve 
financial reporting (i.e., an interaction).20 Although auditors are only responsible for the 
evaluation of these changes, it is also possible that auditors with expertise could identify and 
initiate opportunities for managers to report voluntary changes (i.e., a main effect). Based on this 
discussion, we provide the following example of a research question: 
RQ15: Does auditor expertise curtail or encourage manager reporting of voluntary changes? Is 
this to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic reasons? What are the 
characteristics of the companies and their managers in these circumstances? 
 
5.11 Financial reporting choices 
Prior researchers have examined some of the additional data points disclosed with 
voluntary changes, such as the issue type and direction of income effect (e.g., Kaplan and Roll 
1972; Sweeney 1994; Beatty and Weber 2003). We suggest that researchers incorporate these 
data points into research questions on the various topics in Figure 1 to provide further evidence 
on how managers use voluntary changes. For example, in addition to examining the likelihood of 
making voluntary changes, researchers can also examine managers’ propensity to make changes 
that exceed common materiality thresholds (e.g., one percent of sales), their propensity to make 
                                                 
20 For example, auditors can have industry expertise or personal experience with voluntary changes at other clients. 
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changes with no income effect versus those with an income effect, or their propensity to exceed 
(or fall short of) GAAP’s requirements for the information provided in voluntary change 
disclosures. 
Voluntary change disclosure data points such as manager justifications (see Table 5) can 
also serve as the primary focus of a study. Managers justify many voluntary changes using 
accounting reasons that claim the new policy is more reflective of economic reality or more 
transparent. Reasons such as these imply there are benefits from these voluntary changes. 
Researchers could examine earnings response coefficients and indicators of earnings quality 
before and after voluntary changes with accounting justifications to determine whether there are 
indeed benefits associated with these changes. Examining this research question before and after 
SFAS No. 154 could also be informative because retrospective treatment for voluntary changes 
modifies how managers can make opportunistic changes (see Section 5.2 for further discussion), 
suggesting there could be a change in the effect of voluntary changes justified with accounting 
reasons after SFAS No. 154. This leads to the following research question example: 
RQ16: Are voluntary changes disclosed with accounting-improvement related justifications 
associated with changes in earnings response coefficients and earnings quality? If so, are 
the effects different after SFAS No. 154? 
 
5.12 User reactions – stock market 
Some prior studies examining market reactions to voluntary changes find evidence of 
negative abnormal stock returns after companies make income-increasing changes (e.g., Harrison 
1977; Dharan and Lev 1993; Cheng and Coulombe 1993). However, all of the studies of which 
we are aware investigate market reactions to voluntary changes occurring prior to SOX. We 
contend that the passage of SOX and the implementation of SFAS No. 154 warrant a 
reexamination of this literature (see Section 4.1 for a discussion). Market reactions to voluntary 
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changes made after SOX and/or SFAS No. 154 are important empirical questions because the 
research would provide insight not only into investors’ perceptions of voluntary changes, but 
also more broadly into the effects of major legislation and changes in accounting presentation. 
We illustrate one potential question based on SFAS No. 154’s requirement for 
retrospective treatment. Prior to SFAS No. 154, regulators and academics were concerned that 
investors could be alarmed by the increase in restatements following SOX, leading to the 
potential for confusion about the quality of financial reports (Burks 2011). Similarly, many 
practitioners were concerned that the retrospective application of voluntary changes, despite 
being labeled as retrospective application, would lead investors to confuse voluntary changes 
with restatements, resulting in a negative view of voluntary changes (e.g., Pfizer 2004). 
However, it is unclear whether investors are indeed confused by the retrospective presentation of 
voluntary changes. Therefore, we propose the following research question: 
RQ17: Does the market respond differently to voluntary changes after SFAS No. 154? 
 
5.13 User reactions – analysts 
 As we discuss in Section 3.8, the prior literature generally finds that analysts experience 
challenges in forecasting earnings in the same year as and year following company reporting of 
voluntary changes. However, the implementation of SFAS No. 154 is a significant change since 
the time period of the previous studies. This change in accounting treatment could facilitate 
various research questions, and we highlight one example. Retrospective treatment for voluntary 
changes presents prior period financial statements under the new method and, accordingly, limits 
the amount of the change that affects current year earnings. In contrast, prior to SFAS No. 154 
the entire cumulative income effect of the voluntary change impacted current year earnings, and 
prior period financial statements were not revised. If prior period financial statements are 
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presented using the new method, then the collection of analysts’ forecasts for a company after 
the reporting of the voluntary change likely exhibits less dispersion as any adjustments to 
forecasts for the voluntary change are less complex. This leads to the following research 
question: 
RQ18: After SFAS No. 154, are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate and less dispersed 
for company years after voluntary changes? 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Voluntary changes in accounting principle represent explicit choices by managers to 
exercise accounting discretion. This paper develops an organizing framework to review prior 
literature on voluntary changes, provides descriptive insights on contemporary changes, and 
identifies opportunities for future research on voluntary changes. The voluntary change literature 
is robust and has examined many questions using data prior to SOX. Contemporary voluntary 
changes often vary across the pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods by the 
materiality of their income effect, their issue type, and justifications provided by managers, 
suggesting that manager use of voluntary changes has evolved over time. We consider future 
research opportunities on potential determinants of voluntary changes (i.e., strategic incentives, 
environmental conditions, and manager characteristics). We also consider the potential direct or 
moderating role of corporate governance and auditors on manager use of voluntary changes. 
Finally, we consider user reactions to voluntary changes. Our study is useful to researchers and 
standards setters who require knowledge of this fundamental decision to exercise accounting 
discretion, desire an understanding of contemporary voluntary change data, or plan to study 
accounting choice through voluntary changes.   
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APPENDIX A 
Definitions and Examples of Voluntary Change Issue Types 
 
Amort./Depreciation Expense   
Definition: Amortization, depreciation, and depletion expense method (e.g., change from straight-line to units of 
production) including interest expense, fixed assets, mining assets, deferred costs, etc. 
Example: …we changed our method of computing depreciation on domestic fixed assets from the double 
declining method to the straight-line method. – Cyberonics (1999) 
Assets – Capitalize to Expense  
Definition: Expense recognition change from capitalizing an asset to expensing as incurred or accruing a liability. 
Example: …we changed our accounting policy for rail grinding costs from a capitalization method, under which 
we capitalized the cost of rail grinding and depreciated such capitalized costs, to a direct expense 
method, under which we expense rail grinding costs as incurred. – Union Pacific Corporation (2010) 
Assets – Expense to Capitalize  
Definition: Expense recognition change from expensing as incurred or accruing a liability to capitalizing an asset. 
Example: Instruments are hand held devices used by orthopaedic surgeons…instruments are recognized as long-
lived assets and are included in property, plant and equipment. Undeployed instruments are carried at 
cost, net of allowances for obsolescence. Instruments in the field are carried at cost less accumulated 
depreciation… In prior periods, undeployed instruments were carried as a prepaid expense at cost and 
recognized in selling, general and administrative expense in the year in which the instruments were 
placed into service. – Zimmer (2003) 
Assets – Other Recognition  
Definition: Asset recognition including cash, property, plant, and equipment, equity method investments, 
goodwill, and intangibles.  
Example: The Company has reclassified its rotating service spare parts assets from inventory to non-current 
assets in the accompanying Balance Sheets… – Integrated Measurement Systems (1996)  
Classification  
Definition: Classification and net or gross presentation of assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, and expenses. These 
changes have no effect on current period net income, prior period net income, or retained earnings. 
Example: …the Company changed its definition of cash equivalents for presentation in the statement of cash 
flows. The Company previously defined short-term investments with original maturities of 90 days or 
less to be cash equivalents for statement of cash flow purposes. The Company changed its policy to 
exclude short-term investments from cash equivalents. – Selective Insurance Group (2006)  
Complex Issues 
Definition: Complex accounting issues including derivatives, business combinations, deferred taxes, leases, share-
based awards, and asset retirement obligations. 
Example: … the Company elected to designate the changes in forward exchange rates for the measurement of 
effectiveness in net investment hedges… the Company has decided to designate the changes in spot 
exchange rates for the measurement of effectiveness in net investment hedges. – Oracle (2001) 
Consolidation – Timing 
Definition: Consolidation timing including foreign subsidiaries. 
Example: Historically, the Company consolidated its international subsidiaries using the twelve month period 
ended December 31st...Due to more efficient financial reporting procedures, the Company was able to 
eliminate this one month lag in fiscal 2004. - Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. (2005)  
Estimation and Valuation 
Definition: Estimation method changes including workers’ compensation liability, warranty accrual, recoverability 
of goodwill, fair values of goodwill, and insurance reserves and not including amortization and 
depreciation expense. 
Example: …CONSOL Energy changed its method of accounting for workers’ compensation. Under the new 
method, the undiscounted liability is actuarially calculated based on claims filed and an estimate of 
claims incurred but not yet reported. Additionally, the workers’ compensation liability will be recorded 
on a discounted basis, which has been actuarially determined using various assumptions, including a 
discount rate of 6% and a future health care trend rate of 10%, declining to 4.75% in 2010. – CONSOL 
Energy (2004)  
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APPENDIX A - Continued 
 
Goodwill – Timing 
Definition: Assessment timing for goodwill. 
Example: …the date of the annual goodwill impairment test for Field Services was changed to August 31st from 
September 30th. - Duke Energy Corporation (2004)  
Inventory – FIFO to LIFO 
Definition: Inventories change from first in, first out to last in, first out. 
Example: …the Company changed its method of accounting for certain inventories of the Pork Division from 
FIFO to LIFO… – Seaboard Corporation (1999)  
Inventory – LIFO to FIFO 
Definition: Inventories change from last in, first out to first in, first out. 
Example: …one subsidiary used the LIFO (last-in, first-out) method to determine cost...the subsidiary changed to 
the FIFO method. – NS Group, Inc. (1998)  
Inventory – Other Method 
Definition: Other inventory costing changes (e.g., weighted average to last in, first out). 
Example: …we changed our method of valuing our U.S. inventories to the average cost method. In prior years, 
principally all U.S. inventories were valued using the last-in, first-out (“LIFO”) method. – Kraft 
Foods, Inc. (2009) 
Inventory – Other Recognition 
Definition: Other inventory recognition issues including changes in calculation, recognition periods, 
overhead/administrative cost allocation, inventory pools, and price indices. 
Example: The Company assigns cost to store inventories using the retail inventory method…the Company used 
one inventory pool for this calculation…the Company began using approximately thirty inventory 
pools in its retail inventory calculation. – Dollar Tree, Inc. (2010)  
Liabilities 
Definition: Liability recognition including changes in accrual method and related timing of expense recognition. 
Example:  …PECO changed its method of accounting for nuclear outage costs to record such costs as incurred. 
Previously, PECO accrued these costs over the operating cycle. – Exelon Corporation (2000)  
Other  
Definition: Other issues including equity, overall financial statement presentation, and issues with unclear 
disclosures. Also includes companies with multiple voluntary changes in the same year. 
Example: …the Company changed the presentation of its cash flows from the direct method to the indirect 
method… – Encore Capital Group, Inc. (2008)  
Pensions – Recognition 
Definition: Pensions recognition including calculations, amortization, and valuation. 
Example: Historically, Verizon has recognized actuarial gains and losses as a component of Equity in its 
consolidated balance sheets on an annual basis. These gains and losses were amortized into operating 
results generally over the average future service period of active employees. Verizon elected to  
 immediately recognize actuarial gains and losses in its operating results in the year in which the gains 
and losses occur. – Verizon Communications, Inc. (2010)  
Pensions – Timing 
Definition: Assessment timing for pensions. 
Example: …we changed the annual measurement date of our pension plan assets used in determining their 
market-related value and of our plan liabilities for our pension plans and postretirement benefit plans 
from September 30 to November 30. – Cummins, Inc. (2002)  
Revenue 
Definition: Revenue recognition issues such as contract accounting and timing of recognition. 
Example: …the Company made a preferential change in its revenue recognition policies regarding semester-
based tuition for its campus-based universities…The universities now recognize tuition revenue ratably 
on a weekly straight-line basis over each academic session instead of the previously used monthly 
straight-line basis. – Laureate Education, Inc. (2006)  
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 APPENDIX B 
Definitions and Examples of Justification Types 
 
Accounting Terms   
Definition: Accounting justification such as better matching, more transparent, more conservative, more reflective 
of economic substance due to factors including better measurement, better precision, better information 
for decisions, and less subjectivity. 
Examples: The Company believes that the straight-line method … provides a better matching of revenues and 
expenses. – TranSwitch Corporation (2003) 
 The change in accounting method was made because the Company believes that it better reflects the 
substance of the Company’s collaborative agreements–… - Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2003) 
Administrative  
Definition: Administrative justification such as utilizing new administrative availability or systems, improving 
timeliness of reporting, facilitating budgeting or planning processes, and improving benefits over costs. 
Example: …the Company changed its annual impairment testing date…The Company believes the last day of the 
eleventh month of the fiscal year is preferable as it provides the Company additional time to complete 
the impairment test and report the results of that test in the Company’s annual filing on Form 10-–. - 
LeCroy Corporation (2008) 
Conforming Policies Within Company (Conforming Policies)  
Definition: Conforming policies across subsidiaries, often due to a recent merger. 
Example: …the Company changed its method of valuing inventories in the United States from the lower of last-
in, first-out (LIFO) cost or market to the lower of first-in, first-out (FIFO) cost or market in order to 
provide conformity among subsidiaries due to recent acquisition–. - Carson, Inc. (1997) 
Conforming Policies with Policies of Peers (Peers)  
Definition: Using accounting principles consistent with industry peers. 
Example: …the new accounting principle is preferable because the direct expense method is the predominant 
method used in the airline industry… - World Airways, Inc. (2000) 
In Response to Business or Economic Change (Response to Change)  
Definition: Responding to company changes including changes in fiscal year end and business strategy. 
Example: The adoption of this method…reflects the change in the operating strategy of the Company as a result 
of the BFI acquisition. Previously the Comp’ny's strategy was focused on the acquisition and 
development of waste disposal capacity. Through the BFI acquisition, the Company substantially 
achieved its previous strategy and will now focus on the increased utilization of landfill capacit–. - 
Allied Waste Industries, Inc. (1999) 
Other  
Definition: Other or no justification. 
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 EXHIBIT 1 
Illustration of Pre-SFAS No. 154 Voluntary Change Disclosures  
 
Panel A: Preferability Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – PPL Corporation 
… Note 14 to the financial statements describes a change in accounting principle related to the method of 
amortization of unrecognized gains and losses in the annual pension expense/income… It should be 
understood that the preferability of one acceptable method of accounting over another for the amortization 
of unrecognized gains or losses calculated in the annual pension expense/income determined under SFAS 
87 has not been addressed in any authoritative accounting literature, and in expressing our concurrence 
below we have relied on management's determination that this change in accounting principle is 
preferable. Based on our reading of management's stated reasons and justification for this change in 
accounting principle in the Form 10-K, and our discussions with management as to their judgment about 
the relevant business planning factors relating to the change, we concur with management that such 
change represents, in the Company's circumstances, the adoption of a preferable accounting principle in 
conformity with Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20. 
 
Panel B: Auditor’s Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – PPL Corporation 
…PPL also changed its method of accounting for amortizing unrecognized gains or losses in the annual 
pension expense/income determined under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, 
Employers' Accounting for Pensions, as discussed in Note 14 to the consolidated financial statements. 
 
Panel C: Consolidated Income Statement Excerpt – PPL Corporation (in millions, except per share) 
    2001  2000  1999 
       
            
Income Before Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle    221    524    458  
Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle (net of  
income taxes) (Note 14)    10           
       
Income Before Dividends on Preferred Securities   231   524   458  
Dividends - Preferred Securities   52   26   26  
       
Net Income  $ 179   $ 498   $ 432  
 
Panel D: Note 14 Excerpt – PPL Corporation (in millions, except per share) 
In 2001 PPL changed its method of amortizing unrecognized gains or losses in the annual pension 
expense/income determined under SFAS 87, "Employers' Accounting for Pensions." This change resulted 
in a cumulative-effect credit of $10 million after-tax or $.07 per basic share, which is reflected as a 
"Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle" on the Statement of Income. Under the old 
method, unrecognized gains and losses in excess of ten percent of the greater of the plan's projected 
benefit obligation or market-related value of plan assets were amortized on a straight-line basis over the 
estimated average future service period of plan participants. Under the new method, a second corridor 
will be utilized for unrecognized gains and losses in excess of thirty percent of the plan's projected benefit 
obligation. Unrecognized gains and losses outside the second corridor will be amortized on a straight-line 
method over a period equal to one-half of the average future service period of the plan participants. The 
new method is preferable under SFAS 87 because it provides more current recognition of gains and 
losses, thereby lessening the accumulation of unrecognized gains and losses. 
 
Notes: PPL Corporation reported a voluntary change in accounting principle in its December 31, 2001 10-
K. The above are excerpts from the related disclosures.  
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EXHIBIT 2 
Illustration of Post-SFAS No. 154 Voluntary Change Disclosures  
 
Panel A: Preferability Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc. 
…As discussed further in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its 
method of accounting for pension costs… It should be understood that the preferability of one acceptable 
method of accounting over another for pension costs has not been addressed in any authoritative 
accounting literature, and in expressing our concurrence below we have relied on management’s 
determination that this change in accounting principle is preferable. Based on our reading of 
management’s stated reasons and justification for this change in accounting principle in the Form 10-K, 
and our discussions with management as to their judgment about the relevant business planning factors 
relating to the change, we concur with management that such change represents, in the Company’s 
circumstances, the adoption of a preferable accounting principle in conformity with Accounting Standards 
Codification 250, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections. 
 
Panel B: Auditor’s Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc. 
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, in 2010 the Company has changed its 
method of accounting for defined benefit pension costs. All periods have been retroactively restated for 
this accounting change. 
 
Panel C: Note 1 Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc. 
In 2010 we elected to change our method of recognizing pension expense. Previously, for our U.S. 
defined benefit pension plans we used the market-related value of plan assets reflecting changes in the fair 
value of plan assets over a three-year period and net actuarial gains or losses in excess of 10 percent of the 
greater of the market-related value of plan assets or the plans’ projected benefit obligation (the corridor) 
were recognized over a six-year period. Under our new accounting method, we recognize changes in the 
fair value of plan assets and net actuarial gains or losses in excess of the corridor annually in the fourth 
quarter each year (MTM Adjustment). The remaining components of pension expense, primarily service 
and interest costs and assumed return on plan assets, will be recorded on a quarterly basis (On-going 
Pension Expense). While the historical policy of recognizing pension expense was considered acceptable, 
we believe that the new policy is preferable as it eliminates the delay in recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses outside the corridor. This change has been reported through retrospective application of the new 
policy to all periods presented. The impacts of all adjustments made to the financial statements are 
summarized below: 
 
Consolidated Statement of Operations  Year Ended December 31, 2009  
  
Previously 
Reported  Revised  
Effect of 
Change  
Cost of products sold  18,637  19,317  680  
Cost of services sold  4,548  4,695  147  
Selling, general and administrative expenses  4,341  4,443  102  
Income before taxes  2,978  2,049  (929 ) 
Tax expense  789  465  (324 ) 
Net income  2,189  1,584  (605 ) 
Net income attributable to Honeywell  2,153  1,548  (605 ) 
Earnings per share of common stock-basic  2.86  2.06  (0.80 ) 
Earnings per share of common stock-assuming dilution  2.85  2.05  (0.80 ) 
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EXHIBIT 2 - Continued 
 
Balance Sheet  December 31, 2009  
  
Previously 
Reported  Revised  
Effect 
of 
Change  
Deferred income taxes  2,017   2,006   (11 ) 
Total assets  36,004   35,993   (11 ) 
Other liabilities  6,481   6,453   (28 ) 
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)  (4,429 )  (948 )  3,481  
Retained earnings  17,487   14,023   (3,464 ) 
Total Honeywell shareowners’ equity  8,844   8,861   17  
Total shareowners’ equity  8,954   8,971   17  
Total liabilities and shareowners’ equity  36,004   35,993   (11 ) 
    
 
Notes: Honeywell International, Inc. reported a voluntary change in accounting principle in its December 
31, 2010 10-K. The above are excerpts from the related disclosures. Additional disclosures on the annual 
impact of the voluntary change on prior years are available in the Honeywell 10-K.  
  
47 
 
FIGURE 1 
Framework of Prior Research and Opportunities for Future Research  
on Voluntary Changes 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 presents an organizing framework for discussion of prior research and opportunities for future 
research on voluntary changes. Boxes with thick borders and categories in bold font indicate topics that are not 
examined in prior research, but are opportunities for future research. For parsimony, Figure 1 illustrates 
environmental determinants, strategic incentives, and managerial characteristics as determinants of voluntary 
changes and corporate governance and audit firm as moderators of voluntary changes. However, these 
“determinants” could serve as moderators, and “moderators” could serve as determinants.
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF PRIOR LITERATURE ON VOLUNTARY CHANGES 
 
Panel A: Literature on Tax Regulation (Section 3.1) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Morse and 
Richardson 
(1983) 
Examines potential 
tax benefits in the 
years surrounding a 
change in inventory 
costing methods 
• 48 companies from 
1939-1978 in six 
industries with a 
wholesale price index 
IV: 
• Tax benefits of switching to 
LIFO 
DV: 
• Voluntary changes to LIFO  
• Companies with different inventory methods than 
industry peers have different tax benefit 
characteristics. 
• LIFO-switch tax benefits are higher in change year. 
• Companies wait until tax savings hit a certain level 
before making LIFO change. 
• Large companies are more likely to adopt LIFO. 
Dopuch and 
Pincus (1988) 
Examines why 
companies change 
from FIFO to LIFO 
• 70 companies that 
switched from FIFO to 
LIFO from 1965-1978 
• 102 FIFO companies 
from 1962-1981 
• 29 LIFO companies 
from 1962-1981 
IVs: 
• Tax savings 
• Size (Assets and Sales) 
• Market value of equity 
• Net income 
DV: 
• Inventory and cost of sales 
using other costing method 
• Changes to LIFO appear related to tax savings. 
• High inflation rates were likely responsible for LIFO 
adoptions in 1974 due to large immediate tax savings. 
• When the difference between LIFO and FIFO cost of 
sales becomes large, companies switch to LIFO. 
• Companies that use FIFO long-term do not forego 
large tax savings by remaining on FIFO. 
Bartley and 
Chen 
(1992)**** 
Examines whether 
the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 (TRA) 
caused discretionary 
accounting changes  
• 1,863 companies from 
July 1986-June 1988 
IV: 
• TRA time periods 
DVs: 
• Income-increasing/decreasing 
discretionary changes 
• Companies make accounting changes that maintain 
book-tax conformity. 
• Very few companies make accounting changes to 
reduce their exposure to the alternative minimum tax. 
Pincus and 
Wasley 
(1994)*** 
Provides descriptive 
evidence on 
voluntary changes 
and the economic 
characteristics of 
companies making 
changes 
• 2,249 companies that 
made voluntary changes 
from 1969-1988 (2,978 
company years) 
IVs: 
• Sales 
• Earnings growth 
• Leverage 
• Dividend constraints 
• Industry and year 
DV: 
• Voluntary changes 
• The most common voluntary changes are LIFO 
adoptions, which are associated with inflation. 
• Non-LIFO voluntary changes are typically income-
increasing. 
• Companies making income-increasing voluntary 
changes have lower sales, lower earnings growth, 
higher leverage, and tighter dividend constraints. 
• Non-LIFO changes do not cluster by industry/time. 
• Earnings response coefficients negatively correlated 
with non-LIFO changes. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Pincus and 
Wasley 
(1996) 
Examines stock 
returns surrounding 
LIFO changes 
announced prior to 
or at the same time 
as annual earnings 
• 190 companies that 
changed to LIFO from 
1979-1989 
IV: 
• Earnings effect of LIFO change 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• The average return after LIFO change 
announcements is not significant. 
• The market response to LIFO changes disclosed at 
the earnings announcement differs from that of other 
LIFO changes. 
 
Keating and 
Zimmerman 
(2000)**** 
Examines the 
association between 
changes in 
depreciation and the 
tax treatment of 
depreciable assets 
• 232 companies that 
changed depreciation 
methods from 1972-
1994 
IVs: 
• ROA 
• Leverage 
• Current ratio 
DV: 
• Income-increasing changes 
• Tax law removed book and tax depreciation links. 
• The frequency of income-increasing depreciation 
method changes declines after the 1981 tax law. 
• Companies making income-increasing depreciation 
changes for all assets have worse performance than 
companies making changes for new assets only. 
 
Panel B: Literature on Company and Industry (Section 3.2) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Bremser 
(1975)**** 
Compares earnings 
for voluntary change 
companies to control 
companies 
• 80 companies with 
accounting method 
changes from 1965-1970  
• 80 control companies  
IVs: 
• EPS 
• ROI 
DV: 
• Voluntary changes 
• Companies reporting accounting changes have lower 
EPS and lower ROI than companies that do not report 
accounting changes. 
• 81% of accounting changes are income-increasing. 
Lilien, 
Mellman, and 
Pastena 
(1988)**** 
Examines whether 
accounting changes 
can be used to mask 
performance 
problems 
• 46 companies ranked in 
the top two and 46 
ranked in the bottom two 
in industry shareholder 
return from 1974-1983  
IV: 
• Successful companies 
DV: 
• Income-increasing and income-
decreasing accounting changes 
• Unsuccessful companies are more likely to make 
income-increasing accounting changes. 
• The same results hold for companies in the top half 
as well as for companies in the bottom half of the 
Fortune 500 in terms of size. 
 
Panel C: Literature on Economy (Section 3.3) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Frishkoff 
(1970)*** 
 
Provides 
descriptive 
evidence on 
voluntary changes 
• Approximately 4,500 
companies reported in 
Earnings Digest column 
in Wall Street Journal 
from 1967-1969 
IV: 
• Year 
DVs: 
• Number of voluntary changes 
• Issue type 
• There is an increase in voluntary changes overall and 
in income-increasing changes. 
• Depreciation changes increased threefold from 1967-
1969. 
• Companies make changes to reduce income 
decreases amidst economic uncertainty and inflation. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Dopuch and 
Pincus (1988) 
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A 
Pincus and 
Wasley 
(1994)*** 
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A 
 
Panel D: Literature on Managerial Contracts, Debt Contracts, and Financial Distress (Section 3.4) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Moore 
(1973)* 
Studies whether 
manager changes 
are related to 
income-decreasing 
discretionary 
changes 
• 36 companies with 
manager changes from 
1966-1969 
• 200 control companies 
IV: 
• Changes in management 
DV: 
• Discretionary changes 
• 23 of the 36 companies with manager changes have 
income-decreasing accounting changes. 
• Manager change companies make more types of 
accounting changes and larger accounting changes. 
• Companies with manager changes are more likely to 
take a bath in the year of the change. 
Smith 
(1976)** 
Examines whether 
manager controlled 
companies make 
voluntary changes 
that smooth income 
• 110 randomly selected 
NYSE companies from 
1954-1962 
IV: 
• Manager controlled companies 
DVs: 
• Earnings smoothing 
• Proportion of changes used to 
smooth income 
• The policy decisions made by manager controlled 
companies smooth income more often. 
Salamon and 
Smith 
(1979)** 
Examines whether 
manager controlled 
companies change 
accounting policies 
to misrepresent 
performance 
• 64 companies randomly 
selected from the 1955 
U.S. Senate Staff Report 
on Factors Affecting the 
Stock Market for 1954-
1962 
IVs: 
• Accounting changes 
• Manager controlled companies 
DVs: 
• Analyst forecast error 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Manager controlled companies have fewer change 
years in which forecast error and abnormal return 
signs align. 
• There is an association between accounting change 
timing and abnormal stock returns for manager 
controlled companies. 
Holthausen 
(1981) 
Examines whether 
debt covenants and 
manager 
compensation plans 
are associated with 
depreciation 
method changes 
and their effects on 
stock prices 
• 139 companies that 
changed from accelerated 
to straight-line 
depreciation for book 
purposes only from 
1955-1978 
IVs: 
• Bonus plan based on earnings 
• Effect of depreciation change 
on EPS 
• Deviation from dividend 
constraint 
• Company size 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Abnormal returns for switching companies are not 
significant immediately after the switch. 
• Abnormal performance is not related to the existence 
of a management bonus plan, the effect of 
depreciation changes on earnings, deviations from 
dividend constraints, or company size. 
• Debt covenants and management bonus plans are not 
determinants of changes from accelerated to straight-
line depreciation. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Schwartz 
(1982)**** 
Investigates 
whether companies 
with uncertain 
solvency use 
voluntary changes 
to influence market 
perceptions 
• 163 companies facing 
possible insolvency from 
1974-1980 
• 163 control companies  
IVs: 
• Bond downgrades 
• Premium interest rates 
• Bankruptcy model predictions 
• Bankruptcy filings 
DV: 
• Voluntary changes 
• Of the companies facing insolvency, 40% make a 
material change with most being income-increasing. 
• Distressed companies make more than twice as many 
voluntary changes and four times as many income-
increasing changes as healthy companies. 
Abdel-Khalik 
(1985) 
Examines the effect 
of changes from 
FIFO to LIFO on 
CEO compensation 
• 88 companies switching 
to LIFO in 1974 
• 88 control companies  
IV: 
• Changes from FIFO to LIFO 
DV: 
• Annual CEO pay 
• LIFO changes do not impact CEO compensation. 
• LIFO-switch companies revise CEO bonus pay to 
reflect the effect of the LIFO change on income. 
Hunt (1985) Examines potential 
determinants other 
than tax savings for 
inventory method 
changes 
• 191 companies that 
switched to LIFO in 
1974-1975 
• 191 control companies  
IVs: 
• Manager bonus plan 
• Close to covenant constraints 
• Manager ownership percentage 
DV: 
• Changes to LIFO 
• Companies with a manager bonus plan are no more 
likely to switch to LIFO. 
• Companies with ratios closer to violating debt 
covenants do not switch to LIFO. 
• Companies with lower levels of manager ownership 
switch to LIFO. 
Abdel-
Khalik, Chi, 
and Ghicas 
(1987)*** 
Examines the effect 
of changes on 
management 
compensation 
• 74 LIFO switch 
companies in 1974-1975 
• 63 companies that 
maintained FIFO 
IV: 
• Income effect of changes 
DV: 
• Salary plus bonus 
• LIFO-switch companies have greater than expected 
executive compensation in the year of change. 
• The increase in abnormal compensation is positively 
correlated with cash flow effects of LIFO changes. 
Healy, Kang, 
and Palepu 
(1987) 
Examines the effect 
of accounting 
procedure changes 
on CEO cash 
compensation 
• 52 companies changing 
from FIFO to LIFO from 
1970-1976 
• 38 companies changing 
from accelerated to 
straight-line depreciation 
from 1967-1974 
• 87 control companies 
IV: 
• Earnings effect of accounting 
change as a percentage of 
earnings before the change 
DV: 
• CEO salary plus bonus 
• There is a positive relation between CEO 
compensation and earnings for companies with LIFO 
and depreciation changes. 
• The effect of inventory and depreciation changes on 
CEO compensation are smaller than industry- and 
market-wide economic changes. 
Moses (1987) Investigates 
whether 
discretionary 
changes are used 
for smoothing 
• 212 companies that made 
discretionary accounting 
changes from 1975-1980  
IVs: 
• Sales 
• Bonus compensation 
• Earnings uncertainty 
DV: 
• Amount of change relative to 
expected earnings 
• Managers make tradeoffs between accounting change 
effects and both the level of earnings and earnings 
variability. 
• Smoothing is associated with company size, 
existence of bonus plans, earnings surprise, and the 
directional impact of changes on earnings. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Johnson and 
Ramanan 
(1988) 
Studies differences 
between companies 
changing to full 
cost accounting and 
those retaining 
successful efforts 
• 19 companies switching 
from successful efforts to 
full cost accounting from 
1970-1976 
• 55 successful efforts 
control companies  
IVs: 
• Debt covenant proximity 
• Exploration intensity 
• Size 
DV: 
• Changes to full cost accounting 
• Companies that change to full cost accounting have 
higher financial risk and exploration activity. 
• Companies that change to full cost accounting also 
have increases in debt financing. 
 
Elliott and 
Philbrick 
(1990)*** 
Examines analysts’ 
forecasts for 
companies that 
make changes 
• 500 companies that made 
accounting changes from 
1976-1984 
IV: 
• Effect of change on EPS  
DVs: 
• Analysts’ forecast error 
• Analysts’ forecast revision 
• Analysts’ forecast dispersion 
• Forecast errors and dispersion are larger in change 
years. 
• Analysts do not fully revise forecasts for the effects 
of accounting changes in the current year. 
• The earnings effects of changes are negatively 
associated with analysts’ forecast revisions. 
Labelle 
(1990) 
Investigates the 
association 
between debt 
covenant 
constraints and 
voluntary changes 
• 183 Canadian companies 
reporting voluntary 
changes from 1979-1982 
• A group of control 
companies  
IVs: 
• Debt covenant limit on leverage 
• Interest coverage limit 
• Dividend constraint 
DVs: 
• Income-increasing changes 
• Income-decreasing changes 
• The interest coverage ratio is negatively associated 
with income-increasing changes. 
 
Ramanan and 
Balachandran 
(1993) 
Studies executive 
compensation when 
companies elect to 
capitalize interest 
on construction 
projects 
• 45 companies that 
changed to capitalizing 
interest on long-term 
construction projects 
from 1966-1974 
• 45 control companies  
IV: 
• Changes to capitalized interest 
for construction projects 
DVs: 
• Excess executive compensation 
• Capital expenditures 
• Companies capitalizing interest do not reduce capital 
expenditures related to construction projects. 
• Companies that change to capitalizing interest 
increase construction borrowing after the change. 
• Cash compensation to top management increases in 
the year of the change. 
Sweeney 
(1994)*** 
Examines the 
relation between 
voluntary changes 
and accounting-
based debt 
covenant violations 
• 130 manufacturing 
companies that were 
first-time violators of 
debt covenants from 
1980-1989 
IV: 
• Debt covenant violations 
DV: 
• Earnings effect of changes 
• Companies near covenant violations make more 
income-, cash-, and non-cash-increasing changes. 
• Companies violating covenants make more income-
increasing changes in year of default than other years. 
• Default costs and accounting flexibility are 
determinants of accounting responses to violations. 
Beatty, 
Ramesh, and 
Weber 
(2002)*** 
Examines how 
excluding 
accounting changes 
from covenant 
calculations affects 
loan interest rates 
• 206 new private loans 
from 1994-1996 
IV: 
• Exclusion of voluntary changes 
for covenant calculations 
DV: 
• Loan interest rate 
• Excluding voluntary changes from covenant 
calculations decreases average rate by 84 basis 
points. 
• Excluding mandatory changes from covenant 
calculations decreases average rate by 71 basis 
points. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
 
Beatty and 
Weber (2003) 
Examines whether 
debt contract 
features affect 
method choices 
• 125 companies with 
material bank debt that 
made voluntary changes 
from 1995-2000 
IV: 
• Changes allowed in calculations 
DV: 
• Income-increasing changes 
• Borrowers with loans that allow voluntary changes 
are more likely to make income-increasing changes. 
• Results only hold for loans that have dividend 
restrictions and performance-pricing provisions. 
 
Panel E: Literature on Industry Peers (Section 3.5) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Pincus and 
Wasley 
(1994)*** 
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A  
 
Panel F: Literature on Audit Firm (Section 3.6) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Gosman 
(1973)*** 
Studies differences 
between companies 
making voluntary 
changes and those 
that do not 
• 100 companies randomly 
selected in 1969 with 
sample period from 
1959-1968 
IVs: 
• Size 
• Industry classification 
• Auditor 
DV: 
• Consistency qualifications 
• Companies with consistency qualifications are larger. 
• There are no differences by industry. 
• Companies with consistency qualifications are less 
likely to use Lybrand, Ross Bros., & Montgomery as 
auditor. 
Eggleton, 
Penman, and 
Twombly 
(1976) 
Provides evidence 
on various factors 
associated with 
voluntary changes 
• 161 companies that 
changed to or from LIFO 
from 1946-1966 
• Same as used in Sunder 
(1973) plus 6 companies 
IVs: 
• Personnel changes 
• Industry 
• Auditor 
DV: 
• Changes to or from LIFO 
• Changes in management are associated with switches 
away from LIFO but not to LIFO. 
• LIFO-switch results are different across industries. 
• Changes to or from LIFO are more likely for Price 
Waterhouse and Ernst & Ernst clients. 
 
Panel G: Literature on Stock Market Reactions (Section 3.7) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Ball (1972) Examines the 
market response to 
voluntary changes 
• 197 companies (267 
changes) that changed 
accounting techniques 
from 1947-1960 
IV: 
• Changes in accounting 
techniques 
DV: 
• The market does not respond to changes in accounting 
techniques. 
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Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
• Cumulative abnormal returns • The market reaction to income changes caused by 
changes in accounting techniques is different from the 
reaction caused by typical changes in income. 
Baskin 
(1972)*** 
Examines 
information content 
of auditor 
consistency 
paragraph 
• 135 companies that 
changed techniques from 
1965-1968 
• 135 control companies 
IV: 
• Changes in auditor’s report 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• The consistency exception paragraph in the auditor’s 
report does not have information content for investors. 
Kaplan and 
Roll 
(1972)*** 
Examines the 
market effect of 
depreciation 
method changes 
• 71 companies that 
changed from accelerated 
to straight-line 
depreciation from 1962-
1968  
IV: 
• Changes from accelerated to 
straight-line depreciation 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Companies that change from accelerated to straight-
line depreciation are poor performers. 
• Depreciation method changes to straight-line 
temporarily boost stock prices in the short term but the 
effect is not significant. 
Sunder 
(1973) 
Analyzes  
voluntary inventory 
costing changes 
and stock prices 
• 155 companies that 
changed to or from LIFO 
from 1946-1966 
IV: 
• Changes to or from LIFO  
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• There is a positive abnormal return in the 12 months 
prior to, but not after, a LIFO change. 
• No association found between stock returns and 
changes from LIFO to FIFO. 
Sunder 
(1975) 
Analyzes voluntary 
inventory costing 
changes and stock 
prices while 
considering risk 
• Same sample as used in 
Sunder (1973) 
IV: 
• Changes to or from LIFO  
DVs: 
• Relative stock risk 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
adjusted for relative risk 
• There is a positive risk-adjusted abnormal return in the 
12 months prior to, but not after, a LIFO change. 
• Changes to LIFO are associated with an increase in the 
relative risk of stocks. 
• No association found between stock returns and 
changes from LIFO to FIFO. 
Harrison 
(1977)*** 
Examines 
differences in 
market responses to 
discretionary and 
nondiscretionary 
accounting changes 
• 280 companies with 
accounting changes from 
1968-1972 
IVs: 
• Discretionary changes 
• Nondiscretionary changes 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Income-increasing discretionary accounting changes 
are associated with negative stock returns. 
• Income-increasing nondiscretionary accounting 
changes are associated with positive stock returns. 
Abdel-Khalik 
and 
McKeown 
(1978) 
Examines stock 
returns around 
changes to LIFO 
and whether returns 
are affected by 
expected 
performance 
• 107 companies switching 
to LIFO in 1974-1975 
• 107 control companies  
IVs: 
• Changes to LIFO  
• Analysts’ expected EPS growth 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• No relation between effects of changes to LIFO and 
analysts’ EPS growth forecasts. 
• The effect of LIFO changes on stock returns depends 
on expectations for the change in EPS. 
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(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Brown (1980) Analyzes the short-
term market 
reaction to changes 
to LIFO 
• 86 companies that 
changed to LIFO from 
1974-1975 
• 73 control companies  
IVs: 
• Changes to LIFO  
• LIFO effect on EPS 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Returns decrease in the short-term after a change to 
LIFO while returns for non-change companies 
increase. 
Holthausen 
(1981) 
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel D 
Biddle and 
Lindahl 
(1982) 
Examines stock 
returns and first-
year tax savings 
from LIFO changes 
• 311 companies that 
adopted LIFO from 
1972-1980 
IV: 
• Adoption year tax savings 
realized from switch to LIFO  
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• The magnitude of tax savings from LIFO adoptions in 
1974 are positively associated with abnormal returns. 
• LIFO adoption is negatively associated with changes 
in systematic risk. 
Ricks (1982) Provides evidence 
on market reactions 
to LIFO adoptions 
• 275 companies that 
switched to LIFO in 
1974 
• 275 control companies  
IV: 
• Changes to LIFO  
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Stock returns of LIFO change companies are lower 
after the change but equal to returns of non-adopters 
within 12 months. 
• The difference in returns is largest in the week of the 
preliminary earnings announcement. 
Stevenson 
(1987) 
Provides evidence 
on stock returns 
associated with 
changes to LIFO 
• 351 companies that 
changed to LIFO from 
1974-1975 
IV: 
• Tax savings from LIFO switch 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• LIFO change companies experience an increase in 
stock prices. 
 
Cheng and 
Coulombe 
(1993) 
Studies the market 
reaction to the 
announcement of 
income-increasing 
voluntary changes 
• 77 companies that 
announced income-
increasing voluntary 
changes (excluding 
changes to LIFO) from 
1977-1984 
IVs: 
• Earnings effect of change 
• Financial leverage 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Companies with greater financial adversity make 
income-increasing changes. 
• Abnormal returns in the announcement period of the 
change are not different from zero. 
• Abnormal returns after changes are positively 
associated with unexpected earnings and negatively 
associated with prior information about adversity. 
• Associations are stronger for highly leveraged 
companies and changes during non-recession periods. 
Dharan and 
Lev 
(1993)**** 
Examines 
accounting changes 
and stock returns 
• 285 companies with 
discretionary accounting 
changes from 1978-1989 
• 285 control companies  
IV: 
• Earnings effect of discretionary 
changes 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Changes do not impact current-year stock returns. 
• Income-increasing changes are negatively associated 
with returns in years after change. 
• Five years after an income-decreasing change, 
abnormal returns exceed the returns for companies 
with income-increasing changes. 
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Key Findings 
Hand (1993) Analyzes the effect 
of uncertainty 
about changing to 
LIFO on stock 
returns 
• 821 companies that 
changed to LIFO from 
1974-1975 
• 100 potential adopters of 
LIFO 
IV: 
• Probability of a change to LIFO 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Companies considering a LIFO change that do adopt 
have a negative abnormal stock return. 
• Companies considering a LIFO change that do not 
adopt have a positive abnormal stock return. 
Link, Lopez, 
and Rees 
(2007)**** 
Studies long-run 
stock performance 
of voluntary change 
companies and 
changes in earnings 
informativeness 
• 518 voluntary change 
companies from 1982-
2000 
• 584 control companies  
IV: 
• Analysts’ forecast error 
surrounding voluntary changes 
DV: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Trading based on earnings effect of voluntary changes 
does not generate abnormal returns. 
• Voluntary changes do not change earnings 
informativeness. 
 
 
Panel H: Literature on Analysts (Section 3.8) 
Author 
(Date)a Focus of Study Sample Main Variables 
 
Key Findings 
Brown 
(1983)*** 
Investigates 
analysts’ ability to 
forecast earnings 
for accounting 
change companies 
• 200 companies that 
changed accounting 
techniques from 1974-
1979 
• 200 control companies  
IV: 
• Accounting changes 
DV: 
• Analyst forecast error 
• Analysts are less accurate forecasting one year ahead 
earnings for companies with pension changes. 
• Mandatory changes for SFAS Nos. 8 and 34 do not 
affect forecast accuracy, but mandatory changes for 
SFAS No. 13 improved forecast accuracy. 
Biddle and 
Ricks (1988) 
Examines whether 
Ricks (1982) 
results are due to 
analysts’ forecast 
errors 
• 394 companies that 
changed to LIFO from 
1973-1980 
IV: 
• Changes to LIFO  
DVs: 
• Cumulative abnormal returns 
• Analysts’ forecast error 
• Results for 1974 LIFO changes replicate Ricks (1982). 
• Analysts overestimate earnings for change companies. 
• Analyst forecast errors are correlated with excess 
returns and earnings effects of LIFO changes. 
Elliott and 
Philbrick 
(1990)*** 
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel D. 
 
Notes: a All studies in this table examine voluntary accounting changes. The following denote studies that clearly indicate their samples include accounting 
techniques in addition to voluntary changes in accounting principle : **** includes changes in accounting estimates; *** includes mandatory accounting changes 
and method changes for new standards; ** includes extraordinary items; and * includes write-offs, write-downs, and provisions for future losses.  
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection and Company Industry 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Sample VAC 
Total companies disclosing at least one voluntary change  1,315 
Less: Compustat missing data 248 
Less: Subsidiary companies 61 
Sample of companies disclosing at least one voluntary change 1,006 
Less: Companies disclosing changes without a cumulative effect or missing 
cumulative effect information 
402 
Sample of companies disclosing at least one voluntary change with cumulative 
effect information  
604 
 
 
 
Panel B: Voluntary Changes by Company Industry 
 Total 
Industry N % 
Manufacturing 227 22.6 
Retail 127 12.6 
Computers  79 7.8 
Utilities 78 7.7 
Textiles, publish. 78 7.7 
Transportation 77 7.6 
Financial  70 7.0 
Services 68 6.8 
Chemicals 49 4.9 
Food 40 4.0 
Mining /construct. 29 2.9 
Extractive 24 2.4 
Insurance/real estate 23 2.3 
Pharmaceuticals 22 2.2 
Other 15 1.5 
Total 1,006 100.0 
Notes: We define industry classifications according to Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998).   
  58 
TABLE 3 
Frequency and Quantitative Materiality of Voluntary Changes 
 
 
Pre-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Post-SFAS 154 Total 
       
Voluntary changes:  n = 359 n = 243  n = 404  n = 1,006 
Avg. n per year 51.3 60.8  50.5  52.9 
% of n disclosing an income effect 79.1 65.8 *** 39.6 +++ 60.0 
       
Changes with a disclosed income effect: n = 284  n = 160  n = 160  n = 604 
    % income-increasing 48.2 50.6  46.9  48.5 
    % income-decreasing 51.8 49.4  53.1  51.5 
 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
       
Quantitative materiality of income effect: n = 284  n = 160  n = 160  n = 604 
    % of changes < 0.5% of sales 
    % of changes ≥0.5% and < 1.0% of sales 
43.0 
15.8 
51.3 
18.1 
* 
 
49.3 
16.9 
 
 
46.8 
16.7 
    % of changes ≥1.0% and < 2.0% of sales 13.7 10.6  9.4  11.8 
    % of changes ≥2.0% of sales 27.5 20.0 * 24.4  24.7 
 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Notes: We define the time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; post-
SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to 
2013. We measure “quantitative materiality” as the absolute value of the cumulative effect of the voluntary change 
to prior periods divided by net sales × 100. Significance levels for differences in indicator variables are based on z-
stats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. * and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10 and 0.01 level, 
respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 periods. +++ indicates two-
tailed significance at the 0.01 level between the post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 
periods. 
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TABLE 4 
Voluntary Changes by Issue Type 
 
 
Pre-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Post-SFAS 154 Total 
Issue Type N % N %  N %  N % 
Goodwill – Timing 0 0.0 27 11.1 *** 151 37.4 +++ 178 17.7 
Inventory – LIFO to FIFO 78 21.7 42 17.3  48 11.9 + 168 16.7 
Revenue 48 13.4 19 7.8 ** 11 2.7 +++ 78 7.7 
Amort./Depreciation Expense 36 10.0 18 7.4  15 3.7 ++ 69 6.9 
Pensions – Recognition 25 7.0 9 3.7 * 28 6.9 + 62 6.1 
Assets – Capitalize to Expense 27 7.5 15 6.2  19 4.7  61 6.0 
Inventory – Other Method 21 5.9 13 5.3  26 6.5  60 6.0 
Classification 4 1.1 10 4.1 ** 43 10.7 +++ 57 5.7 
Inventory – Other Recognition 18 5.0 17 7.0  7 1.7 +++ 42 4.1 
Assets – Expense to Capitalize 29 8.1 5 2.1 *** 6 1.5  40 4.0 
Estimation and Valuation 22 6.1 8 3.3  5 1.2 + 35 3.5 
Pensions – Timing 8 2.2 23 9.5 *** 2 0.5 +++ 33 3.3 
Liabilities 11 3.1 11 4.5  5 1.2 +++ 27 2.7 
Inventory – FIFO to LIFO 13 3.6 6 2.5  5 1.2  24 2.4 
Complex Issues 7 1.9 8 3.3  8 2.0  23 2.3 
Consolidation – Timing 2 0.6 7 2.9 ** 11 2.7  20 2.0 
Other 6 1.7 1 0.4  12 3.0 ++ 19 1.9 
Assets – Other Recognition 4 1.1 4 1.6  2 0.5  10 1.0 
Total 359 100.0 243 100.0  404 100.0  1,006 100.0 
Notes: We define the time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; post-
SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to 
2013. Issue type definitions and examples are located in Appendix A. Significance levels for differences in indicator 
variables are based on z-stats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 
periods. +, ++ and +++ indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, between the 
post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 periods. 
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TABLE 5 
Voluntary Changes by Justification Type 
 
 
Pre-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Pre-SFAS 154 
Post-SOX/ 
Post-SFAS 154 Total 
Justification N % N %  N %  N % 
Accounting Terms 235 42.0 152 41.2  225 37.5  612 40.0 
Administrative 20 3.6 58 15.7 *** 160 26.7 +++ 238 15.6 
Peers 104 18.6 46 12.5 ** 78 13.0  228 14.9 
Conforming Policies 63 11.3 58 15.7 ** 86 14.3  207 13.6 
Response to Change 85 15.2 30 8.1 *** 21 3.5 +++ 136 8.9 
Other 52 9.3 25 6.8  30 5.0  107 7.0 
Total  559 100.0 369 100.0  600 100.0  1,528 100.0 
Total per VAC 1.58  1.52   1.48   1.54  
Notes: Sample contains 1,528 justifications disclosed by 1,006 companies with voluntary changes. We define the 
time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 
is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to 2013. Appendix B 
presents definitions and examples of justification types. Significance levels for differences in indicator variables are 
based on z-stats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 
level, respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 periods. +++ 
indicates two-tailed significance at the 0.01 level between the post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/post-
SFAS No. 154 periods. 
 
